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Alternative Measures of the Differentials Against Net
Corporate Earnings and Stockholders' Income
THE findings presented so far have been based on a number of
assumptions considered to be reasonable and relevant to the problem
under investigation. But they are assumptions—made necessary to this
investigation either because directly germane data were lacking, or
because there appeared to be no firm body of opinion supporting one
particular view among scholars of the subject. At each step a choice
was made from a number of possible assumptions, definitions, or pro-
cedures, as for example: the assumption that the corporate income tax
constitutes a levy on stockholders; the definition of income embodied
in the tax law; and the imputation of net corporate earnings to stock-
holders.in proportion to their dividend receipts. At some of these
points the reader may have found himself a reluctant follower down
the selected path; at others he may have decided that he would have
chosen to go in another direction.
The most likely stumbling blocks in this connection are the in.
cidence of the corporation income tax and the definition of income
generated by the productive activity of corporations. Both these
matters lie in the realm of opinion and conjecture rather than of
established fact. The conjectures are manifold and diverse. The diver-
sity of opinion about the incidence of the corporation income tax
and the appropriate definition of income for tax purposes has made
desirable development of several alternative measures to provide some
idea of how much our results would be affected by a change in one
or another of our basic assumptions.
The presentation in this chapter, then, affords the reader freedom
of choice in connection with quantitative measures of the differential
taxation of stockholders. Natural limitations—of time for the author,
of attention and patience for the reader—preclude an attempt to
exhaust the whole range of possible permutations and combinations
that could be developed as alternative measures. Fortunately, however,
the most important alternatives are easily distinguished, and those
discussed below offer enough variety to enable the reader to choose
his "favorite" (or at least get some idea of what it would look like),
according to his particular views of the shifting and incidence of the
corporation income tax and the "right" way to define income for
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This does not mean, however, that all the alternative measures to
be analyzed in this chapter are considered to be of the same degree
of importance or reasonableness. Compared with our standard meas-
ure, developed and discussed in the preceding chapters, some at least
of these alternatives are presented with diffidence, although they are
based on opinions that seem to be widely held or positively asserted
by their supporters. Reservations will be stated below as the particular
alternatives are examined. All things considered, variant 2 of our
standard measure—the variant used in the earlier chapters—emerges
as the best single concept for answering the questions investigated in
this study. But the results provided in this chapter will enable the
dissenting reader to make the requisite qualifications of some of the
earlier conclusions.
The data used in the alternative tests are for 1947, the most recent
year for which computations are not complicated by income-splitting.
In alternative B—the test that allows, in the definition of income, for
the current cost of replacing inventory and depreciable assets—the
1947 data are an additional advantage because the inventory valuation
correction was higher in that year than in any other included in the
study.
BASIS OF THE ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
Under our so-called standard measure (variant 2) the differential tax
load on net corporate earnings and stockholders was determined,
1. assuming no shifting of the corporation income tax, and
2. accepting the Internal Revenue Code definition of corporate net
income.
Under these conditions stockholders are credited, on the income side,
with the full amount of their pro rata share of net corporate earnings
(on the basis of their dividend receipts) and, on the tax side, with
their proportionate share of corporation income taxes and an esti-
mated amount of future capital gains tax liability on reinvested
earnings. Each of the alternativetests,designated alternatives A
through G, involves a change in one of the assumptions or procedures
underlying the standard measure.
ALTERNATIVE A—ADJUSTMENT FOR SHIFTING
Here the attempt is made to isolate the effect of using a different
assumption about the incidence of the corporation income tax by
measuring the differential burden on net corporate earnings and
stockholders,
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11I. assuming that half of the corporation income tax is shifted for-
ward, and
2. accepting the tax law definition of corporate net income.
In this test, stockholders are credited with only half of their pro rata
share of corporate earnings, and are assigned only half of their pro.
portionate share of corporation income tax. The other half of the
tax is assumed to fall on all individuals in the form of higher prices
for the output of corporations.
ALTERNATIVE B—TAKING ACCOUNT OF CURRENT PRICE LEVELS
Here the attempt is to take into account the current cost of replacing
inventory and depreciable assets, by measuring the differential burden
on net corporate earnings and stockholders,
1. assuming that the incidence of the corporation income tax is
on stockholders, and
•2. revising the Internal Revenue Code definition of net income,
which is based primarily on standard accounting procedures, to
allow for the maintenance of inventory at current price levels,
and for the replacement of depreciable assets at current cost.
Under these assumptions, the full amount of their proportionate
share of corporation income taxes is imputed to stockholders, while
corporate income generated on their behalf and credited to them is
"corrected" as indicated under 2.
ALTERNATIVE C—COMBINING THE SHiFTING AND CURRENT COST ADJUSTMENTS
This alternative represents the combined effect of A and B. The
differentials are derived by
1. assuming that only half the corporation income tax falls on
stockholders, the remainder being shifted forward, and
2. adjusting income as defined for the corporate tax to allow for
maintenance of inventory and replacement of depreciable assets
at current price levels.
ALTERNATIVE 0—ADJUSTMENT FOR SAVING THROUGH CORPORATIONS
By the standard method, net corporate earnings are imputed to stock-
holders on the basis of their dividend receipts. For this purpose the
ratio of net corporate earnings to dividends is used no matter what
the stockholder's adjusted gross income level. It has been frequently
asserted, however, that stockholders with sizeable incomes seek to avoid
high marginal rates of personal income tax by investing in corpora-
tions that save a high proportion of earnings, for then a part of the
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the lower rates applicable to capital gains, or it can be passed income-
tax free at death. If this argument is accepted, use of the same dividend
multiplier for imputation of corporate earnings at all stockholder
income levels would be invalid.
This alternative attempts to measure, how the results would be
affected by the use of dividend to net corporate earnings ratios that
vary with stockholder income levels. Thus the differential tax load
on net corporate earnings and stockholders is measured,
1. assuming that the incidence of the corporation income tax is
on stockholders,
2. accepting the tax law definition of corporate income, and
3. assuming that the higher the stockholder's income, the greater
the tendency to hold shares in corporations which distribute a
lower than average proportion of their earnings.
ALTERNATIVE E—IMPUTING ONLY EARNINGS FOR DISTRIBUTION
This test is designed, for those who, holding that "a bird in the hand
is worth two in the bush," feel that there is something more "real"
about what stockholders receive, i.e. dividends, than what they could
have received, i.e. retained earnings.
Thus the extra tax load on stockholders is measured in a fashion
differing from our standard method in two respects:
1. The income of stockholders includes only earnings for distribu.
tion which is the amount that had to be earned before corporate
tax to support the dividend outpayments actually made;
2. The tax liability of stockholders includes only that portion of
total corporate income tax liability that is allocable to dividends.
Setting up this calculation does not constitute an endorsement of
the assumptions on which it is based. My own opinion, set forth in
the Introduction and stated again below, isthat the appropriate
conceptual approach to the questions posed for this study calls for
allocation to stockholders of all of corporate net income, and, similarly,
allocation to them of the whole of the corporate income tax liability.
ALTERNATIVE F—IMPUTING ONLY A FRACTION OF
RETAINED EARNINGS
This alternativeissuggested by the adjustment incorporated in
variant 2 of our standard method, which assumed, among other things,
that only 72 cents of every dollar of reinvested earnings showed up
in increased stock prices. Would it not be appropriate, then, to con-
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JiALTERNATIVE MEASURES
since this is all the market credits them with?1 For reasons set out in
Chapter 1, 100 per cent imputation of retained earnings appears to
be more relevant to the problem under investigation, but for those
who may judge differently Alternative F is offered.
ALTERNATIVE G—CORRECTION FOR UNDERREPORTING OF DIVIDENDS
Imputation of all of corporate earnings to stockholders on the basis of
dividend receipts as reported for personal income taxation (standard
method) may be criticized because there is evidence that dividends
are not fully reported for this purpose.2 Moreover, this evidence sug-
gests that the extent of underreporting varies among income classes.
Alternative G has been developed to determine whether our findings
would be substantially affected by an adjustment for underreporting.
While many other alternatives are possible, the seven outlined above
cover the major sources of variation. The conceptual nature of each
of these alternatives and the assumptions used in its computation will
be developed more fully as each is discussed in the sections that
follow. Here, too, the results yielded by the alternative procedures
will be compared with the findings derived from our usual method.
To aid the reader in interpreting the results of the tests reported below,.
it should be noted that each test involved a different basis for computing
imputed gross income and, consequently, a different array of stock-
holder income than that furnished by the standard method. Therefore,
the comparisons in Tables 9 through 11 and 19 through 22 involve
average stockholders with incomes of the same size but differently
defined. In other words, the level of income is standardized, but what
constitutes stockholders' income varies in each case. The tests do not
compare the differential against, say, the $3,000 standard method
definition stockholder with what it would be on this same person
under each of the alternatives. Rather, in every case they compare the
results for two average $3,000 stockholders, one obtained from the
income definition and array of the standard method, the other from
the array based on the income definition appropriate to each of the
alternatives.
1Thereader is reminded that the 72 per cent, the average experience for a period
ending in 1937, is used for this purpose, although it is not regarded as a precise
figure.
2AuditControl Program: A Summary of Preliminary Results, Bureau of Internal
Revenue, May 1951. See also: Selma F. Goldsmith, "Appraisal of Basic Data for
Constructing Income Size Distributions," in Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume
Thirteen, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951; and Daniel M. Holland and
C. Harry Kahn, "Comparison of Personal and Taxable Income," in Federal Tax
Policy for Economic Growth and Stability, Papers Submitted by Panelists Appearing
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RESULTS OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
Alternative A—Adjustment for Shifting
WHAT IF CORPORATION INCOME TAXES ARE SHIFTED?
DIVIDENDS
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As already noted several times, our standard method assumes that the
corporation income tax constitutes a levy on stockholders in the sense
that the earnings made on their behalf are lower than they would
have been by the full amount of the tax. This view of corporate income
tax incidence is old and venerable; it has "seniority" rights, wide
acceptance, and a rationale to recommend it. The theoretical basis
of the argument is simple and direct. A tax on net profit like the
corporation income tax does not impinge on costs at the margin of
production. Therefore, in both competitive and monopolistic markets,
the quantity offered for sale will be unaffected by the tax. So too will
the quantity of factor inputs. It follows, then, that the price of output
and the quantity sold at that price will be unchanged; the same is
true of the prices of productive factors, and the quantities employed.
The corporation income tax, therefore,is not shifted forward or
backward. If this is the case, it must rest on stockholders.
This is the conclusion reached, for example, in two of the most
thorough examinations of this problem.° Itisalso, of course, the
incidence assumption implicit in the charge of "double taxation" of
corporate earnings and its several variants. This view of incidence has
been cited to justify exemption from the normal tax of dividends
under our personal income tax from its inception until 1936, and also
the relief provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of Similarly,
proposals to integrate the personal and the corporate income taxes
would make little sense if the incidence of the latter were not on
stockholders. If the corporate tax is shifted, it is in effect a sales or
payroll tax, or some combination of the two, and the justification for
integrating such a tax with the personal tax is not clear-cut. Many
of those who have investigated analytical or policy problems whose
solution required some conclusion about corporation income tax
8Reportof the Committee on National Debt and Taxation, London, H. M. Sta-
tionery Office, Cmd. 2800, 1927, p. 119; The Shifting and Effects of the Federal Cor-
poration Income Tar, National Industrial Conference Board, Vol. 1, Manufacturing
and Mercantile Corporations, 1928, p. 157. In the second volume of the latter study,
however, a qualification is made for public service corporations where itis con-
cluded that there is probably substantial shifting of the corporation income taxes
levied on them.
4InternalRevenue Code, 1954, Public Law 591, HR. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d sess.,
August 16, 1954, Chap. 736, Secs. 34 and 116(see Chapter 7 of this study for a
discussion of these provisions).
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incidence frequently have adopted the view (with or without mis-
givings) that it constitutes a burden on stockholders. Examples of this
reasoning are found in a number of studies dealing with the allocation
of the tax burden among income classes.5 When faced directly with
a decision on incidence, Carl S. Shoup, in his program for reformula-
tion of the Japanese tax system, proposed a measure based on the
assumption that the corporation income tax rests on stockholders.6
But, as an indication that there is considerable dissatisfaction with
this conclusion, it was Shoup also, who pointed out in a 1948 article
the possibility, at least, that the corporation income tax is shifted or,
more accurately, This same assumption—that the corporation
income tax is not shifted—was adopted by W. L. Crum, who investi-
gated the tax burden on stockholders for 1941.8 His reasoning is
interesting.
"The above-stated point of view of the analysis obviously rests upon
a fundamental assumption that the tax paid by a corporation falls
proportionately on the stockholder's share of corporate net income
and may be regarded as a tax on him. This assumption is in accord
not only with the apparent premise of much current discussion of the
double taxation of dividends and other aspects of the taxation of
corporate income, but also with the doctrine which was formerly
accepted that a tax levied on net income could not be shifted. That
doctrine rested upon an argument which could be convincing only
if the rate of tax were moderate and if the net income were realized
Representative of such studies are the following: Mabel Newcomer, "Estimate
of the Tax Burden on Different Income Classes." in Studies in Current Tax Prob-
lems, Twentieth Century Fund, 1987: Who Pays the Taxes? 76th Cong., 3d sess.,
TNEC monograph 8, 1940; Helen Tarasov, "Who Does Pay the Taxes?" Social Re-
search, Supplement IV, 1942.
Some more recent studies of this problem have utilized this assumption, but have
also made calculations based on alternative assumptions, for example: R. A. Mus-
grave, J. J. Carroll, L. D. Cook, and L. Frane, "Distribution of Tax Payments by
Income Groups: A Case Study for 1948," National Tax Journal, March, 1951; Donald
G. Miller, Taxes, The Public Debt and Transfers of Income. University of Illinois
Press, 1950; John H. Adler and Eugene R. Schlesinger, "The Fiscal System, The
Distribution of Income, and Public Welfare," in Fiscal Policies and the American
Economy, Kenyon E. Poole, editor, Prentice-Hall, 1951.
°CarlS. Shoup, "Tax Reform in Japan," Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual
Con ference on Taxation Held Under the Auspices of the National Tax Association,
Ronald S. Welch, editor, 1950, p. 410. "Under this program the 35 per cent tax on
corporations is regarded as in essence only a form of withholding tax on dividend
income, though not legally so. The tax is assumed not to be shifted forward to
consumers
7CarlS. Shoup, "Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax: Capital Structure and
Turnover Rates," National Tax Journal, March 1948.
8WilliamLeonard Crum, "The Taxation of Stockholders," Quarterly Journal
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under conditions of competition in which monopolistic elements were
absent or negligible. Neither of these requirements isrealized in
connection with the taxation of corporate income in current and
recent years; and the older doctrine has therefore been challenged,
although, so far as I am aware, no attempt at revision has won general
acceptance.
"1 do not herein attempt a revision of the doctrine, or examine in
detail the major considerations which must have a bearing upon any
valid revision. Instead, I first state without supporting argument my
tentative opinion that a substantial, and perhaps large, fraction of the
tax levied on corporate net income is probably not borne by corpora-
tions or their stockholder-owners, but is shifted to customers or non-
executive employees or suppliers. In spite of this opinion, I make
herein the stated assumption for the following reason.
"If any portion of the corporation income tax is shifted to one or
more of the three groups mentioned above, that portion is less pro-
gressive than the prevailing standard of equity, and may even be
regressive. I take as the prevailing standard of equity, for this purpose,
the scale of effective rates—dependent both upon the steeply graduated
surtaxes and upon certain other provisions of the law—of the indi-
vidual income tax. To the extent that the above fundamental assump-
tion is not realistic, we can at once assert that the present corporation'
tax is inequitable according to the prevailing standards of equity.
Question, as to whether the tax is equitable, therefore, remains only
if the said assumption is
Many other expressions of dissatisfaction with the assumption that
the incidence of the corporation income tax is on stockholders could
be cited. More specifically, where does this dissatisfaction arise? It
comes from several sources. The most inclusive is a point of view
contained in a frequently quoted assertion by D. H. Robertson: "If
you throw enough taxation mud at the businessman a good deal
of it will stick."bo A tax that is sufficiently heavy and extensive will
have some effect on output and investment. How these effects will
be exerted and work themselves out has been analyzed in a number
of ways.
Some students, emphasizing the divergence between profits as de-
fined by economists and profits as defined by accountants and tax
authorities, have pointed out that the corporation income tax base
9Ibid.,pp. 18 and 19. Two footnotes that accompany these paragraphs in Crum's
article are omitted; the italics are his.
10D.H. Robertson, "The Coiwyn Committee, The Income Tax and the Price
Level," Economic Journal, December 1927, p. 581.
83ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
ii J. Fred Weston, "Incidence and Effects of the Corporate Income Tax, National
Tax Journal, December 1949, p. 315.
12 Ibid., p. 313.
84
really includes elements of cost in an economic sense,i.e.factor
rewards such as return to owned capital and recompense for entre-
preneurship. It is, therefore, not a tax on net income. Emphasizing
this fact, J. Fred Weston takes issue with the traditional view of
corporate tax incidence in a paper arguing that "accounting net
income on which the corporate net income tax is levied includes
elements of economic cost." The element which he considers probably
to be of major significance is "the noncontractual interest return on
invested capital." He distinguishes between incidence and effects of
the tax: "Since this is a fixed cost, the corporate net income tax is
levied on a fixed cost and itself represents an element of fixed cost.
In the short period, the tax is not shifted under assumptions of com-
petitive conditions, but may be shifted in an oligopolistic market.
In the long period, the presumption indicated is that the tax is shifted.
If tax incidence is defined as the effect of the tax in the short run
and tax effects are defined as the consequences of the tax in the long
run, it may be said that the incidence of the tax is on the common
stockholder, but its effects may also be on workers in the form of lower
wages and on the consumer of the product in the form of higher
prices." The conclusion, then, is that there is good reason to question
the assumption that the corporation income tax rests in full on stock-
holders, particularly in the long run. But there is no definite informa-
tion on how much of the tax is shifted and whether the shifting is
forward via higher prices of output, or backward via lower rewards
for the factors of production, or both. Weston, for example, considers
determination of these unknowns to be an impossible task, and in
this attitude he is joined by other students of the problem.'2
Several types of behavioral response to the corporate tax have been
emphasized by those who hold that it tends to be shifted. Representa-
tive of one line of reasoning is the set of adjustments described by
C. Lowell Harriss, which begins with the premise that "..- present
taxes on business income ... reducethe net return to investors or
risk-takers." The process, in his view, is this: "The funds offered for
such investment will be reduced, because of the lowered net attraction
and also because business earnings are an exceptionally important
source of such capital. The reduction in supply will tend to force up
the gross return, until the prospective net rate is enough to equal
the return available elsewhere. Reduction in the amount of capital
will reduce output below what it would otherwise be; the product
price will be h
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price will be higher than it would otherwise. In this way, some of
the tax is shifted to consumers, and by a method which the business-
man may not fully appreciate. Therefore, the tax is increasingly recog-
nized as a mass consumption tax, like sales and pay-roll taxes. How-
ever, as some investment is thus shifted to nontax lines—bonds and
durable consumer goods—their net yields will tend to fall, reducing
also the net rate expected on taxed investment; some of the tax on
business income is shifted to investors generally."8
In all likelihood, the process of adjustment would not be as clear-cut
and direct as Harriss' summary might suggest. The corporate tax
affects a good part of business enterprise; the postulated adjustments
to it, therefore, will reverberate through all segments of the economy.
What happens to the funds that would otherwise have been invested?
If alternative forms of assets—bonds for example—are sought, will not
the consequent fall in interest rates lead to more investment than
would otherwise have occurred? If output is lower than it would
have been, would not payments to productive factors likewise be lower
than they would have been? If so, demand would be lower than other.
wise, and therefore we cannot say positively that the price of output
will be higher than it would have been. It could be higher, lower, or
unchanged.
Richard B. Goode, apropos of the type of argument presented by
Harriss, comments:
"The conclusion thatif the corporate tax restricts total invest-
ment it will be shifted by a general increase in commodity prices is
not admissible. The quantity of investment is so significant that the
effects of variations in it are incompatible with the assumptions be-
hind the conventional incidence theory. The long-run effects of the
corporate income tax cannot be described by a neat chain of rea-
soning running from a restriction of total investment to a reduction
of output and thence to a higher price level. To determine the effects
of the corporate tax on output account must be taken of its impact
on aggregate demand, including consumption as well as investment.
These effects are meaningful only when viewed in the setting of
alternative government budgets. Moreover, changes in aggregate de-
mand and output are likely to result in price movements the opposite
of those assumed by extension of the traditional incidence theory."4
•Goode, then, points out that when aggregate or "macro-economic"
13C.Lowell Harriss, "Public Finance," in A Survey of Contemporary Economics,
Bernard F. Haley, editor, Irwin, 1952, Vol. II, p. 265.
RichardB. Goode, The Corporation Income Tax, Wiley, 1951, pp. 57-58. The
reader will find a thorough and subtle analysis of corporate tax incidence in Goode's
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15 For some qualification of Goode's criticism, see Richard D. Slitor, "The Corpo-
rate Income Tax: A Re-evaluation," National Tax Journal, December 1952, p. 506.
16 Richard A. Musgrave, Richard Goode. and Gerhard Coim, "Economic Effects of
the Corporation Income Tax" (Appendix of Preliminary Report of the Committee
on the Federal Corporate Net Income Tax of the National Tax Association, 1949),
Proceedings of the Forty-Second National Conference of the National Tax Associa-
tion, 1949, p. 462.
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effects are taken into account doubt is cast on the argument that the
corporate tax is shifted because, by restricting investment, it leads
to a higher price of output. The very existence of a decline in invest-
ment will make unlikely the rise in aggregate demand required for
an increase in prices. Rather a fall in investment will probably lead
to a decline in demand and a consequent fall in prices.15
Another explanation of the process by which the corporate tax
might be shifted focuses attention on market structure and price policy
under other than purely competitive conditions. Suppose that, for
some reason, in a market in which prices can to some extent at least
be set by producers, the existing price is lower than that which would
have maximized profits. Then the imposition of a tax on corporate
income or an increase in the rate of an existing tax might be followed
by an increase in prices, because the tax might encourage the pro-
ducers to take greater advantage of their market power. An example
is given by Musgrave, Goode, and Coim: "In the immediate postwar
period, the existence of large unsatisfied demands for products such
as automobiles is evidence that producers did not raise their prices
to the maximum possible, and an increase in tax rates might have
induced them to revise their price policy. (This, incidentafly, might
have meant lower dealer's profits rather than higher customer prices.)"
Therefore: "Where monopoly positions are exploited with restraint,
imposition of the tax might thus lead to higher prices. Shifting might
occur." But the authors doubt the importance of this possibility, for,
they argue, ",--thisis not likely to be the typical case. The fact.
remains that any such price increase would also have been profitable
in the absence of the tax, and chances are that the adjustment would
be forthcoming in the course of time with or without tax. Shifting,
accordingly, is more likely for a new tax (or recent increase in rates)
than for an old one. Moreover, shifting in the case of rate increase
is more likely than 'unshifting' in the case of rate reduction. Since
the public is more likely to react unfavorably to a price increase than
to a failure to reduce prices (even though profits will go up equally
in both cases), the shifting argument based upon restraint in monopoly
pricing is not readily reversible."6
It is frequently asserted that in inflationary periods the corporate
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tax is passed on to consumers, for the cost of corporate output rises.17
This is primarily a matter of terminology. Can the rise in prices be
attributed to the corporation income tax? Is it not due, rather, to
rising money incomes which lead to inflation? In other words, prices
would have risen anyway. The real question here (and itis very
difficult to assess) is whether, given the expenditure-revenue.borrowing
complex of the particular period, a greater price rise can be attributed
to the corporate tax than to some other tax that might have been
substituted for
Somewhat similar considerations cast doubt on the argument
businessmen, reckoning the corporate income tax among their costs,
mark up prices as a consequence of the tax, and thereby pass the tax
on to the consuming public. For, as Goode points out, "A widespread
attempt to raise prices to recoup the tax can succeed only to the extent
that total money demand increases relative to real output. The price
rise can be maintained only if consumers, business, or government will
finance it by saving less and spending more. Some increases in the
price level might be effected in this way, provided that the initial
markup of prices was not too great, but an offsetting influence would
be the probable curtailment of output and cumulative contraction of
incomes."5
One other possibility remains to be considered—the matter of tax
capitalization. Very simply, when, as a result of the imposition of a
tax, the net income stream from an asset is cut—as would be the case
for the corporate earnings of holders of common stock if the incidence
of the tax were on profits—the capital value of the asset should fall
as a reflection of this reduction in the net income flow. With stock
selling at ten times earnings, i.e., with the capitalization rate at 10
per cent, for example, a reduction in per share earnings of one dollar
due to the tax should cause a ten dollar fall in the selling price per
share.In other words, the selling price of shares should fall by the
present value of all future expected corporate income tax payments.
This capital loss is experienced by those holding the shares at the
time the tax is imposed. Those acquiring shares after that date buy
them "free of tax."
In common with other investigations of the tax burden, the present
study leaves out of account the capital losses (if any) suffered by stock.
holders due to tax capitalization. Throughout the analysis the corpora.
tion income tax is taken to be an annual burden in the sense that,
This is not a scholarly argument and it cannot be specifically documented, but
it is a commonly held opinion.
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assuming its incidence to be on profits,its imposition lowers the have boughtst
potentially disposable income of stockholders.2° It is difficult to deter- and in the pro(
mine how serious, for the present study, is the failure to allow for will reduce th(
tax capitalization. For to the question whether, in fact, the corporate parative yield
income tax is capitalized and to what degree, it is impossible to find that would oth
a quantitative answer or even some general consensus on broad ranges compete for bs
of magnitudes. Thus, while Dan T. Smith has pointed out that an a general decu
"increase in the corporation income tax, assuming a constant price- whose returns
earnings ratio for the stock, will depress the price of the stock corn- bonds, for
mensurately,"21 we cannot (and he does not) stop here. Crucial to the than in propor
argument in this precise form is the assumption of a constant price- tax."22
earnings ratio,i.e. a constant capitalization rate. But itis unlikely Smith, too, i
that this will actually be the case. For the corporate tax cuts such a tiOn argument:
wide swath that repercussions due to it will affect the rate by which "The exact
the capital value of assets is reckoned; in other words, it partakes of rates and stock
the nature of a general tax whereas the capitalization argument strictly per share are
applies to a partial tax—a tax that affects one industry or type of asset. the market vali
Further complexities in assessing the degree to which the corporate or even at all ti
income tax is capitalized have been pointed out by Goode: estimated liqui
First, "General market conditions are reflected in the level of money are among the
income. To the extent that imposition of the corporate tax is defla- assurance abou
tionary and causes a contraction of money income, it will reduce values.
corporate profits before taxes and hence will depress stock prices more "Also, any ge
than the capitalization theory alone suggests... But,if the corporate in corporate in
tax replaces a more deflationary tax or is itself replaced by such a tax, tively indeterm
the change in stock prices will be smaller than the capitalization theory ments, with me
would indicate. These influences may be reinforced by changes in pattern of yield
optimism or pessimism of investors that usually accompany significant of the effects of
changes in general business conditions." but very elusiv
Secondly, "The corporate tax may influence the rate at which future tures financed 1
earnings are capitalized by the securities market in a way that will partly nomic activity
offset the effects of tax capitalization with respect to stocks but will sources. These
extend the effect of the tax to prices of other assets. Since stock prices here as import
will not be adjusted instantaneously to an increase in the tax rate, extent of influe
stocks will become a less attractive investment as compared with bonds These commi
and other assets. Old investors and new investors who would otherwise two points: first
incidence of th
20Thereader is reminded that the amount of this reduction is less than the actual sedlheth corporate tax liability because from this liability is deducted personal income tax
COfl W
that would have been levied on that portion of corporate income used to meet so, to what ext€
corporate tax payments. about which the
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have bought stock will try to shift from stocks to bonds and other assets
and in the process will bid up the price of bonds and other assets. This
will reduce the yield of other assets and will check the drop in com-
parative yield of stocks. Moreover, as the price of stocks falls, funds
that would otherwise have been used to buy stocks will be left free to
compete for bonds and other assets. The result will be equivalent to
a general decrease in the rate of capitalization. The prices of assets
whose returns are not directly affected by the corporate tax—high-grade
bonds, for example—will rise, while the price of stocks will fall less
than in proportion to the decrease in their expected earnings net of
tax."22
Smith, too, has noted a number of qualifications to the capitaliza-
tion argument:
"The exact relationship between changes in corporate income tax
rates and stock prices is vastly involved. Though prospective earnings
per share are probably the most important single factor influencing
the market value of most securities, they are certainly not the only,
or even at all times the dominant, one. Present dividends, book value,
estimated liquidating value, and prospective changes in all of these
are among the other interrelated factors which make impossible any
assurance about the precise effects of changes in tax rates on market
values.
"Also, any general readjustment of stock prices arising from a change
in corporate income tax rates would lead to significant but quantita-
tively indeterminate changes in the yields of other forms of invest-
ments, with inevitable readjustment in investors' portfolios and a new
pattern of yield differentials. Even more fundamentally, a full analysis
of the effects of corporate taxation is complicated by such important
but very elusive problems as the effects of the government expendi-
tures financed by the tax on the general level and direction of eco-
nomic activity and the comparative effects of alternative revenue
sources. These more involved analytical problems can only be noted
here as important qualifications to any simple conclusions on the
extent of influence of corporate income taxation on stock '23
These comments on capitalization appear to be in agreement at
two points: first, for any degree of capitalization to occur the initial
incidence of the corporation income tax must be on stockholders;
secondly, whether the corporation income tax is capitalized and, if
so, to what extent remains a problem fraught with uncertainty, and
about which there is no consensus.
Finally, mention should be made of one area where the assumption
22 Goode, op. cit., p. 70.
8g
28 Smith, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
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that the corporate income tax is not shifted is clearly unreasonable.
Public utility regulatory bodies are required to take into account
income as well as other taxes in determining rates that will yield a
fair return. Income taxes are considered an operating expense. There-
fore, the corporation income tax on regulated utilities tends to be
shifted.24 The lag in regulation and rate adjustment constitutes a
qualifying factor, (Relevant in this connection also is the
partial abatement of corporate income taxes on dividends of preferred
stock issued before 1942 by public utility companies.)26
No allowance has been made for the special treatment accorded
public utilities. The figures on public utility income and taxes from
Statistics of Income cover a wide range of such enterprises, some of
which are probably not under formal regulation, and, therefore, do
not as a matter of course. treat the corporation income tax as a cost,
and others because of the lag in regulation may not have been able
to shift taxes promptly or completely. So it cannot be assumed that
all of the tax total listed for public utilities was shifted. But some of
the tax undoubtedly was shifted. In 1950, about $1.8 billion in corpora-
tion income tax was reported for public utilities in Statistics of Income.
The total of income taxes for all corporations was $17.3 billion. The
potentially shiftable taxes on public utilities were a not inconsiderable
part of the total—about 10 per cent. An adjustment for the corporation
income taxes levied on public utilities would have changed our aggre-
gate totals, but these were not of prime interest. The differentials by
income levels, which were the main subject of inquiry, would not have
been so greatly affected, for any allowance made for public utility
income taxes would apply proportionately to stockholders in each
income class.
CONCLUSION ON INCIDENCE
A brief summary of a number of points of view on the problem of the
incidence of the corporation income tax cannot do justice to the rich-
ness, refinement, and complexity of recent discussions. It is apparent
from such cursory treatment that it is impossible to arrive at a general
consensus. The conclusions and assumptions on incidence in two
previously cited studies merit further examination at this point.
Goode's study—in the author's opinion the most thorough study of
the corporation income tax to date—includes the following conclu-
24Thisargument implicitly assumes that prices set by regulation are lower than
prices that would maximize revenue.
25JesseV. Burkhead, "The Changing Incidence of Public Utility Taxation," The
Journal of Land and Utility Economics, November 1939, pp. 383-385.
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sions on incidence: "These conclusions do not permit a simple state-
ment that the income tax is 'shifted' or is not. Whether
the tax may be said to be shifted is partly a matter of terminology.
Certainly it adversely affects groups other than stockholders, and in
the long run it probably causes some changes in relative commodity
prices. On the other hand, there seems to be little foundation for the
belief that a large part of the corporate tax comes out of wages or is
passed on to consumers in the same way that a selective excise tends
to be shifted to buyers. For both analytical and policy purposes, the
most important conclusion is that the initial or short-run incidence
is largely on corporate profits."27
Or again, and perhaps even more strongly, in explaining the use in
some of his computations of the assumption that the corporation in-
come tax is a levy on stockholders, Goode writes: "It is assumed that
the whole corporation income tax rests on distributed and undis-
tributed profits. The critical reader will recognize that this assumption
is not definitely supported by the findings of the preceding chapter
and that indeed it is to some extent inconsistent with them. The
argument of Chapter Four, however, holds that in the short run the
tax does rest mainly on profits. If this is so, the approach adopted in
the present chapter shows what would happen to the distribution of
income and wealth immediately after increase or decrease of the
corporate tax. This itself is a matter of great importance for tax policy.
Even for the long run it is not clear what other .ssumption would be
more realistic or useful. In particular, there is no basis for assuming
that any specific fraction of the tax is passed on to consumers. The
assumption that the corporate tax rests on corporate profits seems
only slightly less justifiable than the usual working hypotheses that
assign excises entirely to consumers and the individual income tax
wholly to its original payers."28
In 1947 the National Tax Association (with a membership of ac-
countants, lawyers, tax administrators, and academic students of public
finance) appointed a committee headed by Harold M. Groves "to
make a thorough study of the federal income tax with attention to
fiscal, economic and legal aspects In its final report (1950) the
committee summed up its views as follows:
"Our preliminary report analyzed the problem of short-run inci-
dence and, as previously stated, concluded that the corporate tax is
passed on in the short period to a minor extent only." The report
then asks, "Is a different answer required when the long run is brought
caxation," The
27 Richard B. Goode, The Corporation Income Tax, Wiley, 1951, p. 72.
28 Ibid., p. 75.
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into the picture?" No definite conclusions emerge from an extended
discussion which admits its inability to go lieyond deductive reasoning
in an "area not amenable to much empirical evidence." The section on
incidence closes with this sentence: "Whereas short-run shifting of
the corporate tax figures heavily in equity considerations, long-run
effects are seen to be relevant principally as they bear on a desired
level of investment."29 This conclusion is particularly germane to our
study, for ours is primarily a study in equity, i.e., a study of the equality
or inequality of tax burdens on individuals with incomes of similar
sizes but derived in part from different sources.
While no general agreement exists on where the burden of the
corporation income tax rests, enough evidence has now been mar-
shalled to show that the assumption that it rests on profits is neither
unreasonable nor unsupported. This choice—a part of the framework
of this study—is open to criticism but is probably less vulnerable than
any other choice. In view of the uncertainties, however, an alternative
compthation was undertaken to explore the effects of the assumption
that the corporation income tax is shifted in part.3°
RESULTS ASSUMING SHIFTING
For this test computation the most reasonable alternative possibility
appears to be that, as under alternative A, half the corporation income
tax is assumed to be shifted forward. This arbitrary choice of half the
tax is the simplest sort of compromise—between full forward shifting
and zero Since, as will be seen, the results based on this
29FinalReport of the Committee on the Federal Corporate Net Income Tax,
Proceedings of Forty-Third National Conference, National Tax Association, 1950,
pp. 56-58.
30Whilethe personal income tax is assumed in this study and widely among
scholars not to be shifted, its incidence is also open to some of the arguments that
are relevant to the corporate tax. For instance, since some personal taxable income
arises from the activity of business units(individually owned and partnerships).
the question of shifting arises—in this case shifting of the personal tax. The argu-
ment that corporation income taxes limit the spirit of enterprise and the rate of
investment and lead to lower output, higher prices, and hence shifting of the tax
might with equal force be applied to the personal income tax of businessmen. It
might also be claimed that workers would be spurred by higher income taxes to
seek higher wages to maintain the same take-home pay, thus tending to force costs
and prices up, if suitable finance for this higher level of payments is forthcoming.
81Miller(op. cit.) used two assumptions:(1) that the corporate tax falls fully
on stockholders, and (2) that one-third of the tax is shifted forward, leaving two-
thirds resting on stockholders. Musgrave. Carroll, Cook, and Franc (op. cit.) used
as their standard case the assumption that one-third of the tax is shifted forward
to consumers, one-eighth backward to wage-earners, and the rest falls on profits.
In addition they considered two limiting cases:(I) full forward shifting, and (2) the
incidence solely on profits. Adler and Schlesinger (op. cit.) used two assumptions:
(I) that the tax is borne solely by stockholders (this was necessary for comparability
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assumption differ systematically from the results based on our standard
method, the reader may assess, qualitatively at least, the effect of
assuming the percentage shifted to be more or less than 50. More specifi-
cally, under this alternative corporations are assumed to act as tax
collectors for the government—as retailers do in the case of a retail
sales tax—to an amount of 50 per cent of the corporate tax. Therefore
only half the corporate tax is taken to be a direct liability on stock-
holders and only half of the corporate tax is included in the earnings
imputable to stockholders.
The procedures outlined earlier in connection with the standard
method were employed, except that a smaller amount of income was
imputed to stockholders and a smaller corporate tax burden was
allocated to them. The pattern of these results compared with those of
the standard method is therefore predictable, at least in direction.
With the same absolute adjustment made on both the income and
tax side, a greater proportionate reduction will occur in the tax lia-
bility. The effective rate of corporate tax is lower, and therefore the
net extra burden against corporate earnings (both distributed and
retained) and stockholders will be smaller. The differentials as meas-
ured under alternative A are significantly lower than those obtained
by the standard method.
A comparison of the differentials against net corporate earnings and
stockholders under the 50 per cent shifting assumption with the results
by the standard method appears in Table 982Notehow much smaller
the alternative A values are. Compared with the results by the standard
method, the differential against net corporate earnings is from 9 to
over 13 percentage points lower (column 3). The standard method
indicates an extra burden equal to 25 per cent of net corporate earn-
ings at the bottom of the income scale; the assumption that 50 per
cent of the corporate tax was shifted results in a differential less than
half as great. At the $25,000 stockholder income level, the standard
method results in an extra burden of 2 per cent; alternative A results
in a tax benefit of 10 per cent. For the average stockholder with
$500,000, the standard method shows an a.iual tax rate on the net
corporate earnings component of his income some 26 percentage points
82Thisand the following tables compare the differentials against average stock-
holders having incomes of the same size but defined differently according to the
standard method and to that of each of the alternatives. The level of income is
standardized, but the constituents of the income vary in each case. The
comparison is not of the burden on the $3,000 income level(standard method
definition) stockholder, for example. with the burden on the same stockholder under
the alternative A assumption; rather, the comparison is of results for two $3,000
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INCOME method A (2) —(1) method A (5) —(4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 24.6 11_i —13.5 5.9 2.3 —3.6
3 23.8 10.7 —13.1 4.8 2.5 —2.3
5 22.5 9.4 —13.1 5.2 2,4 —2.8
10 17.7 5.0 —12.7 6.0 1.6 —4.4
25 2.0 —10.0 —12.0 1,0 —4.5 —5.5
50 —7.6 —18.1 —10.5 —4.8 —10.9 —6.1
100 —16.2 —26.3 —10.1 —11.9 —18.4 —6.5
250 —24.5 —33.9 —9.4 —19.4 —26.6 —7.2
500 —25.7 —34.8 —9.1 —22.7 —31.1 —8.4
lower than would have been the case had this component been reached
promptly and in full by the personal income tax; the assumptions of
alternative A, however, result in a greater degree of undertaxation—
an effective tax rate almost 35 points lower than that of the personal
income tax alone. As a corollary of the lower effective rates of alterna-
tive A we find its cross-over point (the income level at which under.
taxation begins) to be much lower down the income scale than that
of the standard method—$15,000 of imputed gross income as compared
with $30,000.
The value of this test lies not in the precise amounts of the differ-
entials based upon the assumption that half the corporate tax is
shifted. The 50 per cent is an arbitrary choice and the differentials
would change with assumptions of a greater or a smaller degree of
shifting. The test does enable us to conclude that if the corporate tax
is in fact shifted, the measures derived from our standard method
overstate the extra burden against net corporate earnings (understate
it where it is negative). If shifting occurs to a degree greater than 50
per cent of the tax, the overstatement is greater than Table 9 indicates;
if, however, less than 50 per cent of the tax is shifted, the overstateS
ment is smaller. As among different income levels, the overstatement
of the differential against corporate earnings by our standard method,
if shifting actually is the case, is greatest in absolute terms for the
lower incomes. But the income level differences are not large. Finally,
the general pattern traced out by the differentials against net corporate
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earnings in our standard method appears distinctly in the alternative
A values—a steady decline in the differential as the level of stockholder
income rises.
What shifting of the corporation income tax implies for the extra
burden related to the whole of stockholder income is shown in columns
4-6 of Table 9. If as much as half of the corporation income tax was
shifted in 1947, it appears that the double taxation of stockholders
compared with the single taxation of other personal income taxpayers
led to a relatively slight extra burden on the owners of corporate
shares. In no case did it result in more than 2.5 percentage points of
extra tax liability. The benefit to stockholders with larger incomes was
more significant; at the $500,000 level the tax burden was more than
50 percentage points lower than it would have been if there had been
no corporate tax and all their corporate earnings had been taxed as
personal income (see column 5 for the differential at other levels).
How much these results differ from those provided by our standard
method can be determined by the comparison in column 6 of Table 9.
CONCLUSION ON SHIFTING
We may conclude from the results of the test that, if there is any
validity in the contention that the corporate tax is shifted and if the
degree of shifting is significant (as much as 50 per cent of the tax), the
main concern on equity grounds is "undertaxation" of stockholders.
In 1947, for example, the "overtaxation" that occurred for the stock-
holders in income classes of $10,000 and below was relatively slight
compared with the results based upon imputation of the whole cor-
porate tax to stockholders. For those in the classes above $10,000
(more precisely, $15,000), however, "undertaxation" of sizeable propor-
tions would have existed if half the corporate tax was really shifted
forward.33
33 These generalizations apply to our test as far as it was carried. But it might be
argued it was not carried far enough for it does not trace out the burden of the
shifted part of the corporate tax on stockholders and others. To do this would be
difficult, but the type of difference it would have made can be suggested.
Stockholder in..ome always includes an imputed component. Consumption ex-
penditures, however, upon which the shifted corporate tax would fall, are geared
more closely to income actually received than to imputable income. If our compari-
son is taken to be between stockholders and non-stockholders with a similar amount
of income, albeit differently defined, the non-stockholders will show a larger amount
of consumption and will bear more of the shifted corporate tax than the stock-
holders. Thus the differentials against corporate earnings and stockholders would be
smaller and the negative differentials would be larger than those shown in Table
9, with the difference being more pronounced the higher the income level.
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Alternative B—Taking Account of Current Price Levels
So far, throughout this study we have used the Internal Revenue Code
definition of corporate net income, which generally follows the ac-
cepted usages of accounting practice,34 and therefore is most valid for
periods of unchanging prices. In the last decade and particularly since
the end of the war, this definition of corporate income has been
criticized because conservative accounting usages provide inadequate
allowance for the cost of replacing inventory and plant in the deter-
mination of taxable income. Some part of what is called net corporate
earnings in this study, it is contended, is not net at all because it is
required to maintain capital intact in real terms. However, there is
disagreement about what this connotes for the proper definition of
taxable income. This section presents briefly some representative
points of view on this matter and the results of a test designed to take
account of current price levels in the determination of taxable income.
CHANGING PRICE LEVELS
While there is general agreement that there exists no one definition
of income that is most appropriate for all the uses to which the concept
of income is put, the discussion of what income is, or should be, is
very voluminous and complex. This section proposes not to add to
this discussion or to explore many of the facets of it, but simply to
explain what alternative B is and why it was developed.
With constant price levels, the conventional accounting practices for
computing cost of inventory used up (or converted) and value of
physical capital destroyed during the productive process provide an
accurate measure of net income. This view implies that if dividends
equal to the designated net income were paid out, a company would
be able to continue a physical level of operations exactly similar to
its previous scale, with its capital remaining intact. Stationary price
levels would limit a change in value of inventory to a physical change,
and estimated depreciation would amount to a total just sufficient to
purchase replacement units of capital.35 Under conditions of changing
price levels, however, this strict equivalence is destroyed. With rising
prices, part of what is reported as net income, by conventional account-
ing standards, must be devoted to replenishing inventories and re-
placing depreciated assets. The steep rise in prices during the period
following World War H focused attention on this problem. But even
34DanThroop Smith and J. Keith Butters, Taxable and Business Income, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, 1949, p. 9.
35Thisneglects any changes in technology that would make it less costly to ob-
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before this, there had been noticeable discontent with acceptance of
standard accounting procedures by the Internal Revenue Service,
particularly in connection with the valuation of
There is general agreement that, for some purposes at least, standard
accounting usages do not provide the most relevant measure of income
generated during a given period. As set forth by Lintner in 1949:
"When the purpose in view. .. isto evaluate the results of ordinary
current operations of business firms, it is generally most appropriate
to use profits figures which exclude, so far as is practicable, all elements
of capital gains and losses which reflect changes in price levels as such,
rather than the operating characteristics of the enterprise. To this end
it is necessary to express all costs as well as all receipts in terms of cur-
rent price levels, and this requires that the entire amount of what are
generally called 'inventory profits' be eliminated from reported profits
data, together with the excess of current replacement costs of book
values of the capital equipment 'used up' in the course of producing
current outputs."37 Or, again, as stated by Fabricant in 1950:
"To obtain comparable figures that measure business income from
a consistent economic point of view, economists are therefore driven
to make adjustments of accounting data, or at least to attach qualifi-
cations to them. Economists follow the principle that costs should be
related to revenues on the same price level basis, and that the income
of one period should be compared with the income of another period
on the same price level basis. In accord with this principle, economists
believe that inventory revaluations should be excluded from business
income, and the income estimates of the National Bureau of Economic
Research and of the Department of Commerce do exclude them. Econ-
omists believe, also, that revaluations of fixed assets should be excluded
from business income, and the income estimates of the National
Bureau and Department of Commerce both exclude realized capital
gains and losses. The estimates of the National Bureau further exclude
revaluations of fixed assets arising from the charging of depreciation
at original cost. The Department of Commerce also accepts the prin-
38Since1938, taxpayers have been permitted to use the method of
inventory valuation which tends to tone down inventory profits and losses, in 1947, it
is estimated, this method, Lifo, was being used by companies with inventories rep-
resenting about 9 per cent of the total book value of manufacturers' inventories, or,
translated to 1947 prices, somewhere between 13 and 17 per cent (see J. Keith But.
ters, assisted by Powell Niland, Effects of Taxation: Inventory Accounting and Poli-
cies, Harvard University Press, 1949, pp. 54.55). The inventory valuation adjustment
of the National Income Division of the Department of Commerce, used in the test
to be described below, makes allowance for the fact that some companies use Lifo.
37JohnLintner, Corporate Profits in Perspective, American Enterprise Associa-
tion, 1949, P. 13.
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ciple, but hassofar implemented it only by a textual qualification of
its
Acceptance of this concept of income as most appropriate for income
tax purposes is not, however, universal. An illustration is Lintner's
statement:
"For many purposes, however, it is entirely appropriate that ele-
ments of capital gain or loss be included in profit figures. For instance,
one of the distinguishing characteristics of the ownership and manage-
ment of property and business enterprise, as compared with supplying
current labor services, is that the former provide opportunities for the
realization of capital gains, as well as risks of incurring capital losses.
An appraisal of the relative changes which have occurred in the total
economicposition of different groups in the economy over any period
of time which failed to allow appropriately for such changes in capital
position would obviously be incomplete and misleading."3°
Goode has made a strong case for historical cost valuations in defin-
ing income for tax purposes:
".-.Lifoin practice has proved to be a tax-relief device for a
relatively small group of taxpayers. The method cannot be convinc-
ingly defended on general grounds as a refinement of the definition
of taxable income. To be sure, it has eliminated a speculative element
of profit that is largely extraneous to the primary activities of the
businesses using it. But general price fluctuations make speculators of
everyone who holds tangible wealth or money claims or who engages
in long-term contracts. A case in equity can be made for eliminating
inventory profits and losses from the tax base, while including other
speculative gains and losses, only by showing that the situation of the
inventory holders is peculiar to a degree warranting special classifica-
tion. This case has not been made for that group of taxpayers who
have found it feasible to use Lifo. -
Anobjection to the adoption of the current-cost approach for
depreciation, however, is that the economic-power concept is not con-
sistently followed in the statutory definition of taxable income. Gains
and losses are ordinarily recognized for tax purposes only when 'real-
ized' as the result of a bona fide transaction. Unrealized gains and
losses are ignored. As a matter of principle, recognition of an increase
in costs not yet objectively realized in a transaction can hardly be
38SolomonFabricant, "Business Costs and Business Income Under Changing
Price Levels," in Five Monographs on Business Income, Study Group on Business
Income, American Institute of Accountants, 1950, p 154.
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justified unless unrealized gains on capital assets are also recognized
for tax purposes, or all capital gains and losses are ignored.
"The problem may be illustrated by considering an asset with a
normal life of twenty years bought in year I at a cost of $100. At the
end of year 5 one.fourth of the original cost will have been written off
if the straight.line method is followed, and the depreciated value will
be $75. Suppose that in year 6 the price of comparable new assets rises
by 20 per cent, to $120. On the current cost basis the true cost of the
old asset in year 6 will be one-twentieth of $120, or $6, rather than
the $5 of normal depreciation. But the price increase has also raised
the value of the remaining useful life of the asset, from $75 to $90.
If both this unrealized capital gain of $15 and the unrealized incre-
ment in cost are taken into account, the taxpayer has a net gain in
year 6 of $14. In each of years 7 through 20, the taxpayer's income
will be $1 smaller than under normal depreciation. Over the whole
period the unrealized gain and the unrealized cost increment will
exactly cancel. Of course, the net tax may be affected by the timing
of income in the absence of complete averaging of income for tax
purposes.
"The foregoing illustration brings out an elementary fact that,
surprisingly enough, has been largely ignored in recent discussion of
depreciation policy: Owners of physical assets benefit from an inflation
as compared with holders of fixed money claims... Alongwith
organized labor and farmers, the owners of business assets enjoy an
increase in money income. Since the additional money income is
generally subject to taxation, regardless of source and its real pur-
chasing power, there seems to be no case in equity for special tax
treatment of the owners of depreciable '40
Onthe other hand, a substantial body of opinion holds that for
income tax purposes the costs of replacing inventory and depreciable
assets at current price levels should be taken into account. Representa-
tive of this point of view are: a statement by W. A. Paton,
-Itis to be hoped that, in revising the Internal Revenue Code,
Congress will give serious attention to the possibility of authorizing
the use of current replacement cost of materials used and the replace.
ment cost of plant facilities expired, as of the end of the taxable year,
as deductions in lieu of deductions based on unadjusted book costs.
I understand that developments along this line have occurred in the
4°Goode,op.cit., pp. 171 and 174-175. For a more extended treatment of this
question see E. Cary Brown, Effects of Taxation: Depreciation Adjustment for Price
Changes, Harvard University Press, 1952, especially Chap. IV.
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income-tax statutes of some foreign And one by G. 0.
May,
"If the Group should feel, as the present writer does, that an in-
crease in charges for exhaustion is called for in the public interest as
well as by sound accounting, the best prospect of implementing that
view would seem to lie in a revision of the tax law which would (as
in the case of LIFO inventorying) allow the increased deduction for
tax purposes, provided the same method was employed in the regular
accounting of the taxpayer."42
In summary, both standard accounting techniques and the tax code
regulations, with the exception of the Lifo option, include inventory
profits in income and make no allowance for increased cost of replacing
fixed assets. To some students itis not completely clear on equity
grounds that any change in this practice is required in defining taxable
income. Others, however, support a change to allowances based on
current costs. In deference to this latter point of view adjustments
were devised to assess the change in findings that would result from
use of a more "real" concept of income.43
TAKING ACCOUNT OF INVENTORY PROFITS AND
DEPRECIATION AT CURRENT COST
To compare the 1947 differentials obtained by the standard method
with those taking account of current prices for replacement of inven-
tory and depreciable assets, adjustments were made in net corporate
earnings to be allocated to stockholders.
The fact that the sharp price rises in the course of 1947 led to
inventory profits was first taken into account. As a measure of the
change in inventories due to price rather than quantity changes the
inventory valuation adjustment figure estimated by the National In-
come Division of the Department of Commerce was used." The adjust-
ment figure for 1947 of $5.8 billion was subtracted from corporate
earnings imputable to stockholders. The adjustment for inventory
valuation is difficult to estimate and is not among the more firmly
41 William A. Paton in Profits, Report of a Subcommittee of the Joint Committee
on the Economic Report on Profits Hearings, 80th Cong. 2d sess., 1949, p. 143.
42 George 0. May, Business Income and Price Levels, An Accounting Study, Study
Group on Business Income of the American Institute of Accountants, 1949, p. 65.
43 This does not imply support (or condemnation) of a "real" definition for tax
purposes. It was not employed for our standard method because the approach in
this study has been to compare stockholders with other personal income taxpayers,
and the latter including business enterprises subject to the personal tax have re-
ceived no special tax abatements because of inflation.
44 Survey of Current Business, Dept. of Commerce, July 1953, p. 13.
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based items in the national income accounts,45 but it is the best figure
available. Choice of 1947 for the year of test was, as previously noted,
fortunate, for in this year the inventory valuation adjustment was
higher than in any other of the period and points up the change most
dramatically. Parenthetically, had the test been made for 1949 or 1952,
an addition to stockholder income would have been necessary on this
score.4°
The second adjustment deals with depreciation. Data bearing on this
are scant, but fortunately, there is E. Cary Brown's estimate of the
extent to which current costs of replacement exceeded historical
costs47; for 1948-1951 he estimated that current costs exceeded his-
torical costs by about 50 per cent.48 Assuming the same ratio to have
been applicable in 1947, an adjustment was made in the total of
corporate earnings imputable to stockholders by subtracting $2.6
billion, half of the total depreciation reported by all corporations in
that year.49 Table 10 gives figures for comparison of the differentials
by the standard method and by alternative B.
For 1947, after defining income net of costs computed in relation to
current price levels, we find the differentials against net corporate
45 National Income Supplement, 1954, Survey of Current Business, Dept. of Com-
merce. pp. 122-125.
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Source: Survey of Current Business, Dept. of Commerce, July 1953, pp. 12-13.
47 Brown, op. cit., p. 28. Details of his estimate will be found on pp. 151-154.
48 Actually, it is his judgment that 30 per cent is more correct, but he rounded
to 50 to "prevent any understatement." This, then, constitutes an upper limit of
possibilities.
49 Another source provides a figure on the same order of magnitude. In a study
published by the National Association of Manufacturers ("Major Tendencies in
Business Finance," Economic Policy Division series No. 57, p. 69) depreciation at
current price levels wasestimatedas $2.2 billion higher than corporations actually
took for 1947.
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I)earnings to run anywhere from 15 to 20 points higher than the values
provided by our usual method. Whereas the latter procedure, at the
$1,000 income level, for example, indicates that 25 per cent more of
stockholders' pro rata share of net corporate earnings went into taxes
than would have been the case under the personal income tax alone,
alternative B places the extra tax liability at almost 40 per cent. At
the $25,000 average stockholder income level, the usual method shows
a slight degree of overtaxation of net corporate earnings—some 2 per
cent; under alternative B, however, it is much greater—over 18 per
cent. At the top of the income range a similar discrepancy exists. By
the standard method stockholders, on average, were undertaxed on
the net corporate earnings component of their income to a much
larger degree—nearly 26 per cent—than by alternative B just about 6
per cent.
However, it should be noted that, while the alternative B differen.
tials are higher, they follow the same general pattern disclosed by
our standard method; the higher the average stockholder's income, the
lower the differential against the net corporate earnings component
of his income. Also, both methods show, after a point, a tax benefit
for stockholders who enjoyed a lower tax under the combined cor-
income tax structure than would have been due if
there had been no corporate tax but instead the whole of the corporate
earnings component of their income had been subject currently to the
personal income tax. In the case of alternative B, however, the tax
102
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INCOME method B (2)— (1) method B (5) —(4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 24.6 39.5 14.9 5.9 7.9
3 23.8 393 15.7 4.8 8.2 3.4
5 22.5 38.1 15.6 5.2 9.4 4.2
10 17.7 33.4 15.7 6.0 11.1 5.1
25 2.0 18.3 16.3 1.0 7.4 6.4
50 —7.6 10.1 17.7 —4.8 5.7 10.5
100 —16.2 1.7 17.9 —11.9 1.2 13.1
250 —24.5 —5.3 19.2 —19.4 —4.1 15.3
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saving was much lower and started higher up the income scale, the
"cross over" point being about $135,000 while for the usual method
it was $30,000. The same type of difference shows up in the differential
against stockholders when the results of the standard method and
alternative B are compared. The differences between results by the
alternative adjustments and by the usual method become increasingly
pronounced as the proportion of corporate earnings increases with
rising imputed gross income level of stockholders (column 6).
CONCLUSION ON COST ADJUSTMENTS
We may conclude that the reader who thinks that alternative B em-
bodies a more meaningful definition of income than our standard
method should view the results of the latter as understating the differ.
entially heavier effective rates of tax to which most stockholders are
subject, and overstating the degree of tax benefit that the stockholders
at the top of the income scale
Alternative C—Combining the Shifting and
Current Cost Adjustments
Alternatives A and B are not mutually exclusive. Some readers may
hold it most realistic to assume that the corporation income tax is
shifted and also that it is appropriate to define income for purposes
of the corporation income tax exclusive of the cost of inventory main-
tenance and depreciable asset replacement at current price levels. To
illustrate how much, under these conditions, the results would differ
from those obtained through our standard procedure, alternative C
has been developed.
This alternative is a simple combination of alternative A (in which
the adjustments tend to lower the differentials) with alternative B (in
which the adjustments tend to raise them). What is the net result
when both sets of adjustments are incorporated in our calculations?
The data of Table 11 provide the answer.
Over the lower portion of the average stockholder income range up
to about $10,000, the alternative C differentials are about the same as
those obtained by the standard procedure; but above this level, the
so This interpretation of results holds for most years of the study which, however,
show variations in the degree of over- and understatement, probably most pro.
nounced in 1947, and least in 1952 when the inventory valuation adjustment was
opposite in sign to (but smaller than) the adjustment for current cost depreciation.
For 1949, however, the two definitions would probably give closely similar results,
for the inventory revaluation allowance was positive, necessitating an addition to
stockholder income, and was just large enough to cancel out the excess of current
over historical cost of depreciable assets.
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TABLE 11













method C (2) —(I)
(1) (2) (3)
method C (5) —(4)
(4) (5) (6)
1 24.6 24.0 0.6 5.9 5.4 —0.5
3 23.8 24.8 1.0 4.8 4.4 —0.4.
5 22.5 23.7 1.2 5.2 5.0 —0.2
10 17.7 19.4 1.7 6.0 5.1 —0.9
25 2.0 7.1 5.1 1.0 8.0 2.0
50 —7.6 0.2 7.8 —4.8 0.1 4.9
100 —16.2 —7.1 9.1 —11.9 —4.1 7.8
250 —24.5 —12.5 12.0 —19.4 —8.9 10.5
500 —25.7 —13.2 12.5 —22.7 —10.9 11.8
differentials are larger. Also, from this point on, the higher the stock-
holder income, the greater the difference between results of the two
procedures. The cross-over from over- to undertaxation, which in the
usual procedure occurred at $30,000, takes place under alternative C
at about $51,000.
The reader who regards alternative C as the most accurate and
reasonable framework in which to analyze our problem probably will
have few reservations about the standard method's findings over the
lower portion of the income range, but he will consider those findings
over the rest of the income array an understatement of the extra
burden on net corporate earnings and stockholders. He is reminded
that columns 3 and 6, providing some idea of the quantitative nature
of the amendments he will want to make, apply strictly only to 1947.
For most other years, except 1949, the changes would be in the same
direction as for 1947. Moreover, the 1947 adjustments are derived from
a 50 per cent shifting assumption. Should the reader prefer to assume
a greater degree of shifting than this, the alternative C values of the
differential would lie closer to those of the standard method at the
top of the income scale, and below them at lower stockholder incomes.
On the other hand, if a smaller than 50 per cent assumption were
employed, the comparative understatement of differentials by the
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investor quoted hadAlternative D—Adjustment for Saving through Corporations
rtd Alternative C, 1947 WHAT IF CORPORATE SAVINGS ARE USED TO AVOID
PERSONAL INCOME TAXES?
In this investigation, the standard method imputes all of net corporate
earnings to stockholders on the basis of their dividend receipts, the
ratio for imputation being the same for every income-dividend size
stockholder cell.
However, it has been frequently pointed out that, because corporate
distributions are subject upon receipt as dividends to personal income
tax, stockholders (particularly in the higher income classes subject to
stiff marginal rates) are induced to save via the corporate mechanism
and thereby avoid personal income taxes on the retained portion of
corporate earnings, until realized in the form of (less heavily taxed)
capital gains or passed on income-tax free at death.
Such an attitude has been expressed by one investor as follows: "We,
that is, my wife and I, prefer common stocks as an investment, but
not for all our funds. We choose corporations which pay out a mini-
mum of earnings in order to have our holdings grow in intrinsic value.
We like to save by having corporations plow back a substantial portion
of their earnings tax.free to us. If the corporations pay us dividends,
we have to pay taxes on the income."5'
If there is a systematic tendency for upper-income stockholders to
blunt the impact of high personal income surtax rates by holding
shares in corporations known to pay out a small fraction of their earn-
ings, and if this is quantitatively important enough so that the dis-
tribution ratio(i.e. the ratio of dividends to net corporate earnings)
for high-income taxpayers is lower than the average distribution ratio
for all taxpayers, then the results obtained by our standard method
may be in error. The upper-income stockholders will really be claim-
ants to more of the total of net corporate earnings than our method
credits them with; those lower down the income scale should really be
credited with less. For example, suppose that there are only two
classifications of stockholders, one "high-income" and the other classi-
fication comprising the rest. Let dividends received total $20,000 for
all stockholders, with the high-income group receiving $5,000 and all
the rest $15,000. Net corporate earnings are assumed to equal $100,000.
Now assume that the high-income group purposely holds stock in
high-saving corporations which have only a 10 per cent distribution
51J.KeithButters, Lawrence E. Thompson, and Lynn L. Bollinger, Effects of
Taxation: Investments by Individuals, Harvard University Press, 1953, p. 200. The
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I,ratio. The other shareholders, on average, receive their dividends on
shares in corporations which average a 30 per cent distribution ratio.
Thus, the high-income stockholders should be credited with $50,000
or 50 per cent of the net corporate earnings, and all other shareholders
with a similar amount. However if, as in our standard method, the
over-all average distribution ratio of 20 per cent for both classes of
stockholders were used, the high-income shareholders would have
$25,000 (which is less than their actual share) allocated to them, and
to the others would be imputed $75,000 (which is more than their
actual share). While the average distribution ratio is 20 per cent for
all stockholders, for the high.income group it is only 10 per cent (i.e.
below average) and for the other, 30 per cent (i.e. above average).
It is desirable, therefore, to assess the quantitative importance .of
the choice of distribution ratios by a comparative test. Unfortunately
little information is available for this purpose. The only data I have
been able to find that bear on this problem are not focused directly
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ANALYSIS OF AVAILAELE EVIDENCE
There is available for 1936 a cross-tabulation which gives the asset size
of dividend paying corporations and the net income class of dividend
recipients filing income tax returns for that year.52 The dividends
received by shareholders, tabulated by 27 net income classes, are classi.
fled on the basis of asset size (10 in all) of the originating corporations.
For instance, stockholders in net income class $70,000 and under
$80,000 received 0.37 per cent of their dividends from corporations
with assets less than $50,000; they received 0.52 per cent from corpora.
tions with assets of $50,000 and under $100,000, etc. These data, more
refined than those available for any other year, can be used to estimate
differences in average distribution ratios associated with the dividend
receipts of taxpayers in the various net income classes, because, on
corporations in each asset size class had different distribution
ratios. These ratios tend to increase with the asset sizes of the dividend
distributing (See Table 12.) Note that these ratios, at
best, only approximate the information relevant to the problem posed
for alternative D. Directly relevant would be data derived from an
array in which the distribution ratio itself constituted the basis for
classifying the data. Use of an approximation qualifies the result of
52 Bulletin of the Treasury Department, Dept. of the Treasury, January 1943,
pp. 3-6.
53 Cf. George E. Lent, The Impact of the Undistributed Profits Tax, Columbia
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All net income corporations 4,562.500 6,696,613 0.6813
Source: Statistics of Income for1936, Part 2.Bureauof InternalRevenue.
the test (summarized in Table 13) and tends to damp the figures
finally obtained compared with the results that would have been
tamed from data classified directly by dividend distribution ratios.
Basically, the test involved computing a distribution ratio for each
net income class, by weighting each asset size distribution ratio (Table
12) by the proportion that dividends paid by corporations in this asset
size class comprised of the total dividend receipts in each net income
class.
These test procedures and their results are merely indicative and are
not directly comparable with the standard method developed in this
study. In the latter, stockholders in each adjusted gross income class
were divided into a number of dividend size groups, corporate earn-
ings were imputed on this basis, and stockholders were rearrayed in
imputed gross income classes. In the test a much rougher calculation
was undertaken. Corporate earnhgs were allocated to stockholders in
each income class(net for 1936) in accordance with the average
amount of dividends for all stockholders in that class, without rearray-
ing. The relevant values for all net income classes appear in Table 13.
The pattern of deviations from the overall average distribution ratio
is surprisingly Starting with the lowest net income class
54 The deficit income class is neglected for purposes of this discussion because
the calculations covered taxpayers only. Moreover, purposeful conduct cannot be
inferred from the deficit class since, presumably, deficits are involuntary.
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TABLE 13
Net Income Class Weighted Average Distribution Ratios, 1936
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and moving up, we find distribution ratios above the overall average,
but the extent of departure from the general average tends to decline.
Dividends representing distribution ratios below average were received
by all classes from $10,000 up to $200,000. The lowest ratio was
reached in the $40,000 and under $50,000 net income class; above this
class the extent of departure from the overall average distribution
ratio becomes gradually less until at the $200,000 and under $250,000
net income level a distribution ratio above average is once more
reached. This above-average ratio is characteristic of the rest of the
income distribution, with the extent of departure from the average
increasing steadily as the income level increases, and reaching its
maximum in the $1,000,000 and over class. If the behavior of these
divergences in distribution ratio were plotted with income on the
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above the origin, and below-average distribution ratios below the
origin, then a plot of the net income class distribution ratios would
be U-shaped.
How important are these differences in the distribution ratios
characterizing the investments of the various net income classes? They
are really very small. It is only at the extreme levels that the divergence
from the average for all classes is over 5 per cent. But, as pointed out
above, if the data were classified by distribution ratio of each dividend
paying corporation, relatively greater differences would probably have
been obtained. An interesting feature of this pattern of distribution
ratio isits regularity. With only a few minor exceptions it varies
smoothly from one income class to the next falling constantly to a
minimum and thereafter rising constantly. This pattern is not exactly
what would have been expected solely on personal income tax avoid-
ance grounds. It is true that over a significant range the distribution
ratios for the higher net income receivers are below average and this
is reasonable. But if it is rational for a $45,000 net income shareholder
to seek to hold personal taxes down more than average, via corporate
saving, is not the pressure to do this even greater on the $450,000 net
income stockholder? But the latter typically received dividends repre-
senting a distribution ratio higher than average.
The results of this test do not positive generalizations for
1936 for a reason beyond the lack of precise and suitable data: uncer-
tainty arises because the undistributed profits tax, instituted in 1936,
stimulated dividend distribution and changed the relative pattern of
distribution ratios of different asset size class There is
certainly no basis for concluding that many higher income class tax-
payers did not choose investments in companies with very meager
distribution policies in order to forestall high personal surtaxes. But,
in 1936 at least, this tendency appears to have been almost completely
counterbalanced and even swamped (in the case of top income classes)
by the opposite choice of stock in corporations with distribution ratios
above average.56 In that year, considerations other than corporate
Cf. Lent, op. cit. According to Lent, while all but one asset class were in-
duced by the undistributed profits tax to distribute more liberally, the greatest rela-
tive increase was made by corporations in asset size classes in which a higher propor-
tion of stock was held by taxpayers in the middle range of net income classes. Over
this income interval the test disclosed distribution ratios below average—despite the
influence of the new tax. Therefore, in the absence of the undistributed profits tax.
the overall average distribution ratio of Table 13 would have been higher and, for
each income class, the extent of the deviation from this average would have been
greater (but in the same direction as the table shows).
56 There may be, in some cases, a close relationship between capital gains or re-
sale value of a stock and the corporation's distribution policy which would encourage
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saving rates evidently affected the relationship between size of personal
income, including dividends, and distribution ratios of corporations
from which the dividends were received.
While the above test, fragmentary though it is, suggests that there
was on net balance no pronounced tendency in 1936 for the rich to
seek investment in high-saving corporations, it is possible that in the
years after 1936, when opportunities for tax saving on capital gains
increased,such a tendency became marked. Table 14 provides the E
effective tax rate on an added dollar of ordinary income and the
effective rate on an added dollar of net long-term capital gains for C,.)C.)
taxpayers at selected net income levels. In the years after 1936, the
effective rate on an incremental dollar of ordinary income increased
substantiallyand the tax saving represented by the preferential rate B
on capital gains was much greater. These factors should create an Z
impetusfor those subject to high marginal rates of personal income
tax to hold shares in high-saving corporations, but against this is the
deterrent imposed by the fact that the market prices of shares fre-
quently fail to reflect reinvested earnings. However, other things equal,
therate could be an important factor in the pattern of investment 8
choicesof taxpayers in the higher income classes and also in the
distributionpolicies of corporations controlled by them. Hence the
necessity for an inquiry into the effects of such a possibility upon the 2
relationshipsunder investigation.
investorsto choose stock in corporations that distribute a high proportion of their
earnings.A stockholder explained it in this way:
"One of the main factors that enters into the market value of stock is the dividend
itpays.
"To show how dividends affect prices, I have tried to find a parallel example
withwhich to compare Jersey, and I believe that American Can fills the bill. Both 0
are fine companies; their stocks are really 'prime.' They are rated equally by Fitch.
In 1947 they closed within a half point of each other, around 81. Their high prices
of1948 were within one-eighth point, around 93. The book value of Can is $10 or
so less than that of Jersey, yet Can sold at 91% yesterday, and Jersey sold at 64%.
Why?Perhaps because Can, while earning only $9.71 a share in 1948 increased its 0
dividends from $3 to $4, while Jersey, earning over $12 in 1948, decreased its divi-
dends from $4 to $2. I venture the theory that if Jersey had paid us $4 last year the
stock would now be selling right up where Can is, perhaps even higher" (from a
statement by Mr. Wolf, a stockholder, at the 1949 Annual Meeting of Standard
OilCompany [New Jersey], pp. 20-21 of a transcript published by the company for
its stockholders, July 18, 1949).
Cf. also J. Keith Butters, John Lintner, and William L. Cary assisted by Powell
Niland, Effects of Taxation: Corporate Mergers, Harvard University Press,1951.
p. 49: "It is entirely conceivable that Ashland's policy of paying out a larger per-
centage of earnings as dividends would increase the market value of its securities
more than a policy of negligible distributions; the market value of listed securities—
as contrasted with closely held, untraded securities representing a controlling interest
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rALTERNATIVE MEASURES
Data for 1949 on the patterns of financial asset holdings of indi-
viduals in Wisconsin, made available by Thomas R. Atkinson, permit
inferences to be drawn as to whether high income taxpayers, as a
group, take advantage of the preferential tax rate on capital gains
by concentrating their holdings in corporations having low distribu-
tion ratios. The Wisconsin law requires reporting on state income tax
returns not only dividend receipts but also stock holdings. Having
access to the returns, Atkinson was able to estimate the value of the
stock from which a sampled group of taxpayers received dividends
in For this purpose he divided common and preferred stocks
into two categories—traded and untraded. Stock issues for which divi-
dend and price quotations were available in investment manuals fall
in the traded category and the rest are classified as untraded. The
value of traded stock holdings was determined by multiplying the
average number of shares of the particular issue held by the individual
in 1949 "by the unweighted mean between the high and low 1949
market price." For untraded stock Atkinson used book His
estimates for all Wisconsin taxpayers are presented in Table 15.
The hypothesis that the stock investments of the rich as a group
15
Yield on Traded and Untraded Common Stock
Held by Wisconsin Individuals, Arrayed














50,000 and over 7.5 5.1
All income classes 6.9 4.6
Source: Thomas R. Atkinson, The Pattern of Financial Asset Ownership: Wis-
consin Individuals, 1949, Princeton University Press for National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 1956, p. 131.
aBasedon market value.
b Based on book value.
Thomas R. Atkinson, The Pattern of Financial Asset Ownership: Wisconsin
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ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
are characterized by a lower pay-out percentage than the average per.
centage for stock holdings of all dividend recipients can be tested
most straightforwardly by the data for untraded corporations. For
these companies are more typically small and closely held, and the
operations of such enterprises can be more easily geared to the owners'
personal requirements than. is the case for widely owned corporations.
Moreover, with traded stock, a low dividend pay.out policy might lead
to a fall in the value of the stock (or prevent a rise); therefore the
ratio of dividends to stock value, i.e. the yield, would not be useful
data for testing the hypothesis. Book valuation would not be affected
in this way.
An examination of the data most relevant here (column 2, Table 15)
shows that in general the higher the income class, the greater the
dividend return in proportion to stockholders' equity. On the face of it,
these figures appear to contradict the hypothesis under test, but such
a direct conclusion is not warranted. It is not the ratio, D/B (D =
dividends and Bbook value) which is relevant evidence in this
connection, but more properly it is D/Y (V = earnings) which is the
product of D/B and B/V. Only if B/V is constant or rises from one
stockholder income class to another can the pattern of movement of
the values of D/B be taken definitely to indicate the direction of the
ratio D/V. In other words, since D/B increases reading up the stock
holder income scale, if B/V rises or remains constant then D/Y will
increase with stockholder income. Without evidence on the behavior
of B/V by stockholder income classes, the argument must be inferen.
tial. For income corporations (responsible for almost all corporate
net dividend payments in the years covered) W. L. Crum has demon.
strated that the rate of return on net worth, V/B, tends to fall as asset
size This means that its inverse, B/V. rises with asset size. And
since the 1956 data suggest a loose correlation between corporate asset
size and dividend recipient income class, the D/B ratios in the Un-
traded column of the table can be taken to indicate a D/Y that moves
in the same direction, rising with stockholder income class. The same
result would follow if it were the case that corporations whose stock
is untraded tend to fall within a narrow asset size range, with B/V
roughly constant for all relevant corporation asset size and stockholder
income classes.
Thus, the analysis apparently ends with the conclusion that the
59 William Leonard Crum, Corporate Size and Earning Power, Harvard University
Press. 1939, pp. 27-30. Crum's findings are for each of the years 1931 through 1936.
Similar computations for 1944, 1947, and 1952 confirm the occurrence of this pattern
over the period of this investigation.
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data do not support the hypothesis that high income stockholders, as
a group, tend to invest proportionately more heavily than lower in-
come stockholders do in corporations that save a higher than average
proportion of their earnings. But this is not a conclusion to be pressed
strongly. The chain of argument is not complete; some links are
missing. In particular, the transition from corporation asset size to
stockholder income classes is a rather rough and ready procedure.
Moreover, data for one state in one year are obviously not a valid
basis for generalization.60 The data are too tangential to the problem
at hand and generally too imperfect to sanction a firm conclusion
that, in fact, personal income tax relief via the route of retained
earnings is not sought to a greater relative extent by stockholders in
the higher income classes.
60Indicativeof the need for caution in interpreting these data is the following
information supplied by Atkinson:
"Finally I did some investigating on the reason that the per cent return on closely.
held stocks behaves in an opposite manner than your thesis would require. I broke
the tabulation down into holdings of stocks in corporations from which the holder
also received wages, and stocks in corporations from which they did not. No luck
there. The ratios continued to rise for each type of holding. However, the propor.
tion of low yielding bank stock out of the total closely held stocks owned by each
income group falls as income rises which may account for some of it. Similarly, the
holdings of stock in personal holding companies rise percentage.wise as income in-
creases and these stocks have an extremely large rate of return when computed on
book value basis as the underlying assets, real estate and stocks for the most part, are
carried on the books, for the most part, at purchase price. For instance, the Able
Company is a holding company whose principal assets Consist of Baker Company
stock. The Baker stock must have been valued at the original cost for Able paid out
almost as much in dividends as its total book value in 1949. Thus, even if the operat-
ing company retained a high percentage of earnings, the per cent return on the book
value of the holding company would be very high.
"These factors may account for some of the reasons that the ratios rise. However,
I think the more important reasons have to do with the character of the closely
held corporations the stock of which is held by people in different income groups.
Low income groups hold closely held stock of banks, retail and wholesale concerns
and service concerns, all of which are small businesses which have extremely low
earnings after payment of the wages of the manager who is probably also the
principal stockholder. Their earnings would be much smaller both absolutely and
relative to book. value than some larger closely held corporations. Furthermore, un-
doubtedly the larger closely held corporations are owned somewhat moi" widely,
i.e., outside of management and family circles, and there is a pressure to distribute
dividends to the outsiders, perhaps due to mistrust, and also due to the inability in
many cases for capital gains to be taken by the outsiders because of lack of market
or a market composed only of 'insiders.' Finally, perhaps unions will accept a six
per cent return on investment more easily than high salaries to management in
their bargaining considerations." Letter from Thomas R. Atkinson, February 25,
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A TEST DESIGNED TO MEASURE THE POSSIBLE EFFECT ON THE FINDINGS OF
SAVING THROUGH RETAINED EARNINGS
Because information on the differential rate of individual saving via
corporate reinvestment is fragmentary, because pressures toward mini-
mizing personal surtaxes have become increasingly powerful in the
last decade, and because of a widespread feeling that this applies
particularly to higher income stockholders, it seemed desirable to
undertake a test calculation on the assumption of a distribution of
net corporate earnings reflecting this practice. This test, like those
devised for the preceding alternatives, was made with data for 1947.
The possibility, of preferential tax rates on realized capital gains,
an important part of the argument, was used in setting up the alterna-
tive distribution. It was assumed that the degree to which stockholders
at various income levels consciously sought retained earnings varied
directly with the degree of tax saving achieved by obtaining an incre-
mental dollar as long-term capital gain rather than as ordinary income.
This of course is a rather mechanical view of human nature, particu-
larly when applied to something as complex as the motives that
surround stock ownership. Nonetheless it serves to focus directly on
the point whose effects, if any, the test is designed to isolate.
Nontaxable dividend recipients, having the same marginal rate on
their capital gains and dividend receipts, were assigned a benchmark
weight of one. For all taxable persons, on the other hand, there was
a difference between the marginal rates, a difference that always ran
in favor of long-term capital gains, but varied in relative strength,
growing stronger the higher the taxpayer's income level. For example,
as in Table 16, for the class with taxable incomes ranging between
$0 and under $10,000, the marginal rates on capital gains were on
average only half the rates on dividends, a proportion expressed by
the multiplier of 2 assigned to this class; for the income class $100,000
and under $500,000, the capital gains marginal rates were on average
just over three-tenths of the personal income tax marginal rates, a
proportion expressed by the multiplier of 3.311. Such multipliers were
developed for a number of broad income classes. (See Table 16.)
These multipliers were applied to the amount of retained earnings
after taxes as computed by our standard method. But, of course, the
total retained earnings obtained by this method greatly exceeded the
actual amount of retained earnings. The new values were reduced
proportionately to bring them into line with the actual totals. This
set of figures takes into account the postulated tendency for stock-
holders at the higher income levels to hold stock in corporations that
retain a higher than average proportion of their earnings. With the
115ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
Ratio of marginal
TAXABLE INCOME CLASS capital gain rate to Multiplier
(000's) marginal personal rate [reciprocal of(2)]
(1) (2) (5)
0 and under 10 0.500 2.000
10 and under 25 2.114
25 and under 50 0.40Gb 2.463
50 and under 100 0.334C 2.994
100 and under 500 0.302d 3.311
500 and under 1,000 0.295e 3.390
1,000 and over 3.460
Source: For data, column 2, Lawrence H. Seltzer, The Nature and Tax Treat.
rnent of Capital Gains and Losses, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951,
p. 525.
a Average of rates applying at $10,000 and $25,000.
b Average of rates applying at $25,000 and $50,000.
Average of rates applying at $50,000 and $100,000. -
dRate applicable to $100,000(little variation between $100,000 and $1,000,000).
e Average of rates applicable at $100,000 and $1,000,000.
f Rate applicable to $1,000,000.
total of corporate earnings given, these figures mirror also the assump-
tion that stockholders in the lower income classes receive dividends
from corporations that retain a lower than average proportion of
their earnings.
For 1947, the standard method implied for every income class a
ratio of retained earnings after taxes to dividends of 1.86. For alterna-
tive D, after adjustment, the ratio varies with income class, as shown
in Table 17. With these ratios, the next step was to impute new
TABLE 17
Ratio of Retained Income after Taxes to Dividends under
Alternative D, by Taxable Income Classes, 1947
TAXABLE INCOME CLASS
($000's)
Ratio of retained income
after taxes to dividends
0 and under 10 • 1.52
10 and under 25 1.61
25 and under 50 1.87
50 and under 100 2.27
100 and under 500 2.52
500 and under 1,000 2.58
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Note: There is nothing peculiar about the fact that all but two classes in the table
show a ratio above average, because the nontaxable and the taxable under $25,000
classes together account for a high proportion of total dividends.
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I amounts of corporate earnings and corporate income tax liability to
each stockholder dividend-income sizecell used inthe standard
method. What did all this computational maneuvering achieve? In
our standard method, at all levels of imputed gross income, the ratio
[reciprocal(2)] of dividends to corporate earnings net of corporation income tax stood
at 0.349. Under alternative D the distribution ratio varies all along
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With the rearrayed data, by procedures previously described in con-
etazned income .
esto dividends nection with the standard method, values of the differentials against
earnings for distribution, earnings for retention, net corporate earn-
1.61 ings and stockholders' income were calculated. The results (variant 2
1.87 only) are presented in Table 19.
•2.27 These data suggest that, in all likelihood, the findings of our
2:58 standard method are substantially correct, even if it should turn Out
2.63 that there is a consistent tendency(its strength correlated with the
1.86 degree of tax saving involved in converting a dollar of income into a
classes in the table dollar of long-term capital gain) for the higher income taxpayers so
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Comparison of Differentials under Standard
(per cent)










INCOME method D (2) —(1)
(1) (2) (3)
method D (5) —(4)
(4) (5) (6)
1 24.6 243 —0.1 5.9 5.4 —0.5
3 23.8 24.1 0.8 4.8 4.5 —0.3
5 22.5 23.0 0.5 5.2 5.5 0.3
10 17.7 18.4 0.7 6.0 6.5 03
25 2.0 2.4 0.4 1.0 1.2 0.2
50 —7.6 —7.0 0.6 —4.8 —4.3 0.5
100 —16.2 —16.1 0.1 —11.9 —11.8 0.1
250 —24.5 —26.1 —1.6 —19.4 —20.8 —1.4
500 —25.7 —2.8 —22.7 —25.1 —2.4
proportion of the earnings made on their behalf is retained in the
corporate till.
Alternative E—Imputing Only Earnings for Distribution
Up to this point, the imputed gross income of stockholders used in the
study has included all of net corporate earnings—distributed as divi-
dends, paid out as taxes, and retained by corporations—on the premise
that this is what they could have had as part of their personal income
if there had been no corporate tax, and if corporations had distributed
all of their earnings. This appears to be the most reasonable concept
as a basis for analysis of the differential taxation of stockholders.
However, some recent policy proposals have been primarily concerned
with the distributed segment, and some students have suggested that
the problem be analyzed on this basis.
President Eisenhower proposed, in his Budget Message to Congress
for the fiscal year 1955, that relief from the "double taxation of divi-
dends" be granted stockholders. The relief provisions finally incor-
porated in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 called for an exclusion
from taxable income of the first $50 ($100 for joint returns) of divi-
dends from domestic corporations, and a personal income tax credit
of 4 per cent of all dividend receipts in excess of the excluded
amount.6' This tax relief applies solely to the distributed portion of
61 InternalRevenue Code of 1954, PublicLaw 591. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d sess.,
August 16, 1954, Chap. 736, sees. 34 and 116. These relief provisions are analyzed
in Chapter 7 of this study.
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ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
corporate earnings. Similarly, in criticizing a study of the 1948 tax
burden by Richard Musgrave and three associates, Rufus S. Tucker
stated that "there is no justification for allocating undistributed profits
to the income of stockholders. They are not available to the stock-
holders, except to the extent that they may result in raising the market
price of the stock. They usually have only a slight influence on the
market price, and even if that were not the case the stockholder cou1
only realize them by selling, and his profit from such sales is general
not regarded as income, either by accountants or economists or
ticians, but as capital gains. Even tax authorities do not regard un-
realized capital gains as income."62
For reasons given earlier, the view appears justified that the full
answer to the question of the differential heaviness of the tax load on
stockholders should run in relative terms, i.e., relative to how heavy
their tax load would have been under the personal income tax. This
can be assessed only if stockholders' potential personal income levels
are ascertained, and for this, imputation of undistributed earnings is
necessary.
But, at this point in our examination of the effects of alternatives
of the standard method on the results, it appeared desirable to provide
the reader with some information on what the picture would look like
if the comparison were to deal only with distributed earnings (and the
corporate taxes allocable to them). For this purpose, alternative E has
been developed. For it earnings for distribution serve as the measure
of personal income from corporate activity. Therefore to stockholders'
income is imputed the excess of what corporations had to earn before
corporation income tax over dividends received by stockholders, i.e.
the corporate tax liability on earnings for distribution.63 This same
figure is,of course, included in their tax liability also. The rearrayed
stockholder incomes are then processed as under the standard method.
Alternative E gives two differentials, one against net corporate earnings
(equal to earnings for distribution) and the other against stockholders.
The assumptions and methods embodied in alternative E lead to
results substantially different from those produced by the assumptions
62 Rufus S. Tucker. 'Distribution of Tax Burdens in 1948," National Tax Journal,
September 1951, p. 277.
63 As before, let E equal the earnings made for distribution, D the dividends paid
out, and Ce the effective rate of corporate tax (as a fraction), then
E—C6E=Dor
D
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of Differentials under Standard
(per cent)










INCOME method E (2) —(1) method E (5) —(4)
(3000's) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 24.6 27.9 3.3 5.9 7.3 1.4
3 23.8 27.9 4.1 4.8 4.9 0.1
5 22.5 27.3 4.8 5.2 4.2
10 17.7 24.7 7.0 6.0 5.2 —0.8
25 2.0 16.4 14.4 1.0 4.2 3.2
50 —7.6 11.9 19.5 —4.8 3.6 8.4
100 —16.2 7.9 24.1 —11.9 - 3.5 15.4
250 —24.5 5.0 29.5 —19,4 2.7 22.1
500 —25.7 4.7 30.4 —22.7 2.2 24.9
Differentials against the net corporate earnings component are
higher under alternative E at all levels of stockholder income. (Re.
member, this comparison is undertaken for stockholders with incomes
of similar size but different definition.) As a corollary, for alternative E
there is no cross-over, even at the peak incomes, from extra burden to
benefit. For the differential against stockholders a somewhat different
result makes the extra burden, compared with that of the standard
method, about the same at the lower income levels, and considerably
more severe at the upper income levels. The result over the lower
portion of the income range occurs because, while the differential
against net corporate earnings is higher under alternative E, net cor-
porate earnings comprise a much smaller proportion of stockholders'
total income under the definition used in this alternative than in our
standard method. We can conclude that if it is deemed more "sensible,"
in analyzing the differential tax burden on stockholders, to consider
only that portion of net corporate earnings distributed to stockholders
then our standard method involves an understatement of the differ-
entials against net corporate earnings over the whole income range,
and of the differentials against stockholders at the higher income levels.
Alternative F—Imputing Only a Fraction of Retained Earnings
In Chapter 2, in estimating the future increase in capital gains tax
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income, it was assumed (according to variant 2 which is the standard
method) that stock prices mirror only 72 per cent of the earnings
retained by corporations. In imputing to stockholders their propor-
tionate share of retained earnings, however, the full value—lOO per
cent—was considered appropriate for the problem at hand. Because
some readers may feel that the proportionate share of retained earn-
ings credited to stockholders should be no more than the change in
the value set on their assets by the market, alternative F has been
developed. The adjustment incorporated in this alternative is simple
and direct: only 72 per cent of stockholders' pro rata share of total
retained earnings is imputed to them.64 Stockholders' corporate earn-
ings and total income are lower than under the usual procedure, but
their tax liability is unchanged.65 It follows, therefore, that the alter-
native F differentials would be larger than those derived by our usual
procedure. That these differences are not very important, however,
can be seen from an examination of the data of Table 21.
TABLE 21











INCOME method F (2) —(1) method F (5)— (4)
(000's) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 24.6 27.7 5.1 5.9 6.0 0.1
3 23.8 27.7 3.9 4.8 5.3 0.5
5 22.5 26.3 2.8 5.2 6.3 1.1
10 17.7 21.5 3,8 6.0 7.7 1.7
25 2.0 5.1 5.1 1.0 2.4 1.4
50 —7.6 —4.5 3.1 —4.8 —2.8 2.0
100 —16.2 —13.8 2.4 —11.9 —9.8 2.1
250 —24.5 —21.8 2.7 —19.4 —17.1 2.3
500 —25.7 —22.8 2.9 —22.7 —20.3 2.4
The alternative F differentials against net corporate earnings exceed
those of our standard method by between 2.5 and 4 points, lying close
to the upper value at the lower income levels, and nearer 2.5 at the
64 In a sense, alternative F is another way of allowing for the same considerations
that suggested variant S of our standard method, in which the 28 per cent attrition
is treated as an additional tax and stockholder income is unchanged.
65 The adjustment here is not precise. In view of the time required for retained
earnings to be reflected in stock prices, the present value of this component is some-


















top of the income range. The familiar pattern of decline in severity
as stockholder income rises and, after a point, a turn in favor of net
corporate earnings persists under alternative F. The cross-over point
is higher, however—$38,000 compared with $30,000 for the standard
method. The differential against stockholders is also slightly higher
as measured under alternative F than by our usual method. The differ.
ence between them is almost imperceptible at the lower incomes, but
it rises with stockholder income, reaching a peak of 2.4 percentage
points at the top of the income range. The growing divergence between
the differentials of alternative F and the standard method is explained
by the increase in the proportion of corporate earnings as stockholder
income rises.
Those who prefer as more appropriate inclusion of a fraction rather
than the whole of retained corporate earnings in the income of stock-
holders will conclude that the standard procedure overstates the differ-
entials against net corporate earnings and stockholders. But if im-
puting 72 per cent is judged to be reasonable, the overstatement is
quite small. While the specific findings of this test rest, of course, on
the data for 1947, the general conclusions they suggest hold for the
other years in our period. Moreover, in these other years, the over-
statement would be even smaller because in 1947 retentions repre-
sented a higher proportion of corporate earnings than in any other
year covered by the study.
Alternative G—Correction for Underreporting of Dividends
One step in the standard method is imputation to stockholders of
their full pro rata share of corporate earnings (before tax) on the
basis of their dividend receipts as reported on their personal income
tax returns. But there is evidence suggesting that dividends have not
been fully reported for this purpose.6° (While this is true of other
types of income also our concern here is with dividends.) For example,
for 1952 there was an estimated gap of about $1.1 billion between the
dividends paid out to individuals and total dividends reported on
persc.nal income tax returns.67 The data do not permit a precise state-
ment, but, undoubtedly some of this gap, perhaps a very high fraction,
can be attributed to purposeful underreporting. Thus, the Treasury
has estimated for 1950 that if dividends "not accounted for" on
personal income tax returns (about $1 billion) were reached by a
66 Audit Control Program: A Summary of Preliminary Results; Goldsmith, op. cit.;
Holland and Kahn, op. cit.; Revenue Revisions of 1950, Hearings on HR. 8920 be-
forethe Senate Committee on Finance, 81st Cong., 2d sess., pp. 15-19.
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ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
withholding tax an increase in revenue of $150 million would have
resulted.68 That stockholders have failed to report all their dividends
under the personal income tax is clear. The Audit Control Program
obtained data suggesting that the degree of underreporting varies
among income classes, generally tending to decline in relative im-
portance as stockholder incomes rise. Unfortunately the full statistical
substantiation for this statement, based upon unpublished material
examined by the author, cannot be set forth here.
In brief summary this was the procedure: The data consisted of the
amount of tax change disclosed by audit on returns with major errors
in dividends and minor errors in dividends so classified that they
could be arranged in four broad adjusted gross income classes—under
$7,000,69 $7,000 and under $25,000, $25,000 and under $100,000, and
$100,000 and over. By assuming all of the tax change disclosed by
audit on returns with major dividend errors and half of the tax change
on returns with minor errors to be due to dividend underreporting,
and applying the average marginal rates prevailing in each of these
four broad income classes(different rates for separate and joint re-
turns), an estimate was obtained of the amount of unreported divi-
dends.7° Underreporting showed a general tendency to decline in
relative importance as stockholder income increased.
Estimated Underreporting, 1948
Adjusted gross Unreported dividends







68 Revenue Revisions of 1950, op. cit., p. 19.
69 This class includes returns with up to $25,000 of gross receipts from business or
profession.
7° The criteria for placing a return in the major error in dividends category were:
the error was responsible for the largest portion of the change in adjusted gross in-
come; the change in adjusted gross income, in turn, was responsible for a larger
part of the tax change than that due either to exemptions, personal deductions, or
arithmetical error. The estimate of the amount of unreported dividends in our
test is too high because it is likely that less than the assumed 100 per cent (for major
dividend errors) and 50 per cent (for minor errors in dividends) of the tax change
were due to the dividend errors. It seemed appropriate, in view of the illustrative
nature of the figures, to make these extreme assumptions which provided the maxi-
mum possible value for the factor the effect of which the test incorporated in al-















Had the data used incorporated "fuller" reporting Of dividends, the
findings would have been virtually the same as those drawn from the
standard method (see Table 22). In general under alternative G the
differentials are slightly higher at the lower income levels; the degree
of tax saving slightly greater at the top of the range.
7' Very rough calculations indicate quite a gap between the total underreporting





Finally, on the assumption that these same ratios applied in 1947,
they were used to "correct" the imputation ratios employed in the
various dividend-size income class cells. Whereas our standard method
used a single imputation ratio of net corporate earnings to dividends,


















Application of these ratios furnished the corporate earnings and im-
puted gross income that would have been obtained if stockholders
had been more "truthful" or more accurate in remembering or record-
ing their dividends reported.
The previously noted lack of precision in this test stems also from
the unknown degree of success attained by the Audit Control Survey
in digging up unreported and from the whole string of
assumptions made. But the adjustment under alternative G has illus-
trative value. What does it show?
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TABLE 22
Comparison of Differentials under Standard
(per cent)










INCOME method G (2) —(1) method G (5) —(4)
(1) (2) (5) (4) (5) (6)
1 24.6 23.6 —1.0 5.9 6.0 0.1
3 23.8 24.0 0.2 4.8 4.8 0.0
5 22.5 22.4 —0.1 5.2 5.9 0.7
10 17.7 17.9 0.2 6.0 6.7 0.7
25 2.0 2.1 0.1 1.0 1.1 0.1
50 —7.6 —7.4 0.2 —4.8 —4.8 0.0
100 —16.2 —16.3 —0.1 —11.9 —12.1 —0.2
250 —24.5 —25.4 —0.9 —19.4 —20.1 —0.7
500 —25.7 —26.6 —0.9 —22.7 —23.6 —0.9
125